These documents shed new light on a controversy that began
in 1990. That's when journalist Kathy Kadane wrote
an investigative piece about
the role of the U.S. Embassy and the CIA in providing lists of
names to the forces that were exterminating several hundred thousand
Indonesians following the coup in 1965. Two of the exhibits from the
Archive's website are reproduced here for easier access as GIF files
instead of PDF graphics files, and are also transcribed below for
the benefit of web search engines. ]
...
179. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of
State Djakarta, December 2, 1965.
1628. For Assist. Sec. Bundy from Amb Green. Ref: Deptel 708, Dec
1, 1965.
1. This is to confirm my earlier concurrence that we provide Malik
with fifty million rupiahs requested by him for the activities of
the Kap-Gestapu movement.
2. The Kap-Gestapu activities to date have been important factor in
the army's program, and judging from results, I would say highly
successful. This army-inspired but civilian-staffed action group
is still carrying burden of current repressive efforts targeted
against PKI, particularly in Central Java.
A. Malik is not in charge of the Kap-Gestapu movement. He is,
however, one of the key civilian advisers and promoters of the
movement. There is no doubt whatsoever that Kap-Gestapu's activity
is fully consonant with and coordinated by the army. We have had
substantial intelligence reporting to support this.
B. I view this contribution as a means of enhancing Malik's
position within the movement. As one of the key civilians, he is
responsible for finding funds to finance its activities. Without
our contribution Kap-Gestapu will of course continue. On the other
hand, there is no doubt that they need money. The latter, despite
inflation, is in tight supply, and the comparatively small sum
proposed will help considerably.
C.
D. The chances of detection or subsequent revelation of our support
in this instance are as minimal as any black bag operation can be.
Green
2. [text not declassified] (Ibid.)
Washington, December 3, 1965.
[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files: Job 78-00061R,
Indonesia 2/2 -- State Department Liaison (1959-1966); Secret. 4
pages of text not declassified.]
...
185. Editorial Note
The question of the role the U.S. Embassy in Indonesia in compiling
and providing lists of Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) members to
anti-Communists and Indonesian military authorities has been the
subject of controversy. In 1990 a journalist interviewed Robert J.
Martens, political officer in the Embassy, and then published an
article, "U.S. Officials' Lists Aided Indonesia Bloodbath in 60's."
(The Washington Post, May 21, 1990) Martens sent a letter to
the editor of The Washington Post on June 2, 1990, in which
he stated: "It is true that I passed names of the PKI leaders and
senior cadre system to non-Communist forces during the six months
of chaos between the so-called coup and the ultimate downfall of
Sukarno." Martens continued, "the real point, however, is that the
names I gave were based entirely -- I repeat entirely -- on the
Indonesia Communist press and were available to everyone. This was
a senior cadre system of the PKI -- a few thousand at most out of
the 3.5 million claimed party members." Martens stressed that these
lists of PKI members were "not party rank and file." Martens also
stated categorically in his letter that, "I and I alone decided to
pass those 'lists' to the non-Communist forces. I neither sought
nor was given permission to do so by Ambassador Marshall Green or
any other embassy official." Martens concluded with the statement
that he did not turn over classified information nor was he the
head of an Embassy group that spent 2 years compiling the lists as
stated in the article in The Washington Post. He stated
that there was no such group.
Between December 17, 1965, and August 10, 1966, the Embassy sent
the Department three airgrams listing PKI members. On December 17,
1965, the U.S. Embassy in Djakarta transmitted to the Department
airgram A-398 that contained as enclosures lists of the PKI
leadership and a compilation on the fate of PKI leaders. The
airgram was drafted by Martens who informed the Department that the
Embassy had received a number of reports concerning the arrests of
prominent PKI leaders, often based on suspect evidence. Martens
also cautioned that there was widespread falsification of
documents, such as "alleged confessions some of which can be easily
detected and some not." He then explained that enclosed in the
airgram were two lists. The first was an unclassified list of the
PKI leadership bodies (Politburo, Central Committee, Central
Control Commission, Central Verification Commission, and
Secretariat Central Committee-PKI) with the names of their members
as they existed in May 1965. The second enclosure was a
"fragmentary compilation on the present whereabouts of PKI leaders
based on limited information available." The May 1965 list
contained 95 PKI positions (comprising only 67 individuals since
PKI members often had multiple positions and one official was
identified by two different names). The second list described the
whereabouts of 18 PKI leaders of which all but 2 were either dead,
arrested, or believed to be arrested. (National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 12 INDON)
On March 11, 1966, the Embassy sent the Department airgram A-564
which was drafted by Martens and signed by Edward Masters and
contained as an enclosure an update on the fate of PKI leadership
from the Central Committee, Central Control Commission, Central
Verification Commission and Heads of Provincial PKI Organizations
who were not members of the Central Committee. The airgram
indicated that information on PKI officials "remains extremely
fragmentary but sufficient additional information has been received
to make a new compilation advisable." The enclosure was a list of
80 PKI leaders and their status. (Ibid., RG 84, Djakarta Embassy
Files: Lot 69 F 42, POL 12 PKI)
On August 10, 1966, Ambassador Green sent airgram A-74 to the
Department, drafted by Marten and approved by Masters, which
provided as an enclosure another update of the fate of PKI leaders.
Airgram A-74 provided new information available since March 1966 on
15 senior PKI figures and listed 4 senior PKI officials reported
dead and 20 reported imprisoned. This airgram, which was signed by
Green, indicated that: "A sanitized [ie. Embassy attribution
removed] version of the lists in A-398 has been made available to
the Indonesian Government last December [1965] and is apparently
being used by Indonesian security authorities who seem to lack even
the simplest overt information on PKI leadership at the time (lists
of other officials in the PKI affiliates, Partindo and Baperki were
also provided to GOI officials at their request)." (Ibid., RG 59,
Central Files 1964-66, POL 12 INDON) Partindo was a small left wing
party that was closely allied with larger and more influential
Baperki, an association of Indonesians of Chinese descent.
180. Memorandum From the Chief, Far East Division, Directorate of
Operations, Central Intelligence Agency (Colby) to the Assistant
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)
Document 2, pp. 386-387
